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!
The centennial of the First World War in 2014 created a high impact for research of the events
between 1914 and 1918.i However, the perspective remained a mainly European one, as it can be
seen by having a look in the Cambridge History of the First World Warii, which covers mainly the
European aspects of the Great War. Despite this partially still existing Euro-centrism with regard to
the events of the “seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century,“iii research on colonial spheres and
the use of colonial troopsiv in the international campaigns are especially important to show the
transnational impact of the events during the war years.
The British Empire and its multiethnic colonial sphere had created many different colonial
elite troops, whose members were recruited in Africav, the Punjabvi, and especially Nepalvii. The last
named country provided countless generations of young men to fight and die for the sake of the
British Empire, and military historians as well as those who served as officers in the British army
know that the so-called Gurkhas have been an elite troop inside the British Indian Army for more
than one and a half centuries.
Since the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816),viii the soldiers of Great Britain have been aware
of the military potential of these Nepalese warriors.ix When Britain sent 22,000 men to Nepal, they
had to face an enemy that was not just willing but effectively able to resist the ambitions of the
Empire. After three attempts and the use of the assembled strength of its military system, the British
campaign was finally successful in 1816. The peace treaty signed with the Nepalese ruler on 4
March of the same year finally ended the conflict but also provided the right to the victorious
British Empire to recruit soldiers from the small Asian country, neighbored by India and China. The
war and the fierce fighting of the Nepalese Gurkhas “left each side with an increased respect for the
other”x, and the British officers were more than happy for the opportunity to fill their ranks with the

strong and talented warriors, who seemed to be more than equal to be used against the Afghan
tribes. The Gurkhas proved their talent in countless campaigns on the different parts of the IndianAfghan borderxi, where the regiments had to secure British hegemony for more than a century.
In the following decades, the Gurkhas became a fundamental part of the British Indian Army
serving in the North-West as well as the North-East Frontier of the British Indian Empire, where
they remained in loyal support of its aims and its majesty even during the Indian Mutinyxii in 1857.
The Gurkhas seemed to be the most loyal soldiers because there were almost no desertions and even
when the rebellious forces pleaded for assistance, they remained loyal to their British officers.
During the last two centuries, whole generations of Gurkhas have served as part of the regiments of
the British Indian Army. Even if their main reason for joining the British army might have been a
financial one, the stories of heroism and martiality, “stories of their prowess in battle, particularly
with their short curved knives, called kukris, with the cutting edge on the inside and the notched
phallus on the blade”xiii, would become a major part of their legend. Almost every British officer
who had served with a Gurkha regiment would state that those soldiers were the bravest troops of
the whole Empire. As a consequence, many officers were willing to serve at least some years as part
of a Gurkha regiment in the British Indian Army – the higher pay in this part of the world might
have been a driving force as well. However, not many achieved this aim especially since those
officers who wanted to serve in a Gurkha regiment would have to learn the Nepalese language of
Khas Kura. To be fully accepted by the soldiers meant to be understood by them:

!
The surprise and delight of the Gurkha officers and men at hearing their own dialect spoken by an officer of (…)
high rank, and the way their faces lighted up, would be ample reward for the trouble taken ver “Khas Kura“.xiv

!
Gurkhas, originally meaning 'cow protectors', was a term that just described the people of
Mongolian origin who lived in the Nepalese hills and were part of the warrior class of the small

Asian country. This term thus became synonymous for bravery and heroism. Stories of the brave
Gurkhas can consequently be found with regard to all major wars of the 20th centuryxv, and even
their enemies acknowledged this and described them as “transparently honest men, very brave
sticklers for regulations – the very model of sturdy, honest and simple soldiers”xvi. It is true that
“their military skills and bravery are rightly admired”xvii, and almost every soldier or officer who
met a Gurkha himself was charmed by their simple but friendly habits. Many British officers were
attracted by the service of these short Nepalese soldiers and their constant contact with their former
comrades in arms.xviii It were these Asian soldiers who were described as tremendously brave when
they were fighting and dying for the honor of the British Empire, especially on so many battlefields
during the Great War 1914-1918.xix
The following article will trace the role of the First World War in the creation of the heroic
and transnational image of the Gurkha soldiers, who were recognized not only by their British
officers but also by their enemies, who recognized that these Asian soldiers were especially skillful
when killing Germans or Turks with their kukris on the Western or Middle Eastern front.xx In the
first section, I will provide a short survey of the battlefields of the Great War where the Gurkha
soldiers were sent. This should also affirm that the decision to bring them into the game could be
wise, but also absurd, depending on the characters of the battlefield itself. In the second section, I
will point out the effect of the global influence of the small but brave soldiers to show that the Great
War was responsible for the long lasting myth of the military skills and the heroic bravery of the
Gurkha soldiers.

!
The Great War

!
When the First World War broke out in 1914, the British Indian Army immediately began to
mobilize, and in contrast to the Second World War, there were no antagonist Gandhixxi and no peace

movement that might have slowed down the Indian support for the war cause because such a
movement would have caused problems with regard to an Indian participation in the war scenario.
In August 1914, the Indian Army, therefore, started its own mobilization to send troops to support
the British. Nepal also remained a loyal ally of the British rulers, not only sending money and
weapons in support of the British Indian Army but also recruiting more than 200,000 Gurkhas to the
British regiments, leaving the hills of Nepal without its male population. The Great War, in general,
mobilized the whole human potential of the colonial empires, bringing not only soldiers but also
workersxxii from all around the globe to the European battlefields, where the non-Europeans were
supposed to fight and die for the causes of their colonial rulers. The Gurkha soldiers were
assembled into ten infantry regiments of the British Indian Army and sent to different battlefields of
the Great War, where 10% of these men were going to die what was later called to be an honorable
death. The Asian soldiers “certainly were not consciously fighting to preserve Western civilization
or to make the world safe for democracy”xxiii but were rather longing for honor and glory or pay and
pension or were just waging the fight because they were told to do so by their officers. It is
definitely hard to generalize the motives of the Nepalese men who fought for the sake of the British
Empire. While some of them might at first instance have been just interested in the good payment,
others could have served the cause of the war just as a consequence of tradition. In many Gurkha
families, more than one generation had served in the British service before, so the young men in
1914 could also have seen a possibility to proceed with the family tradition. Despite their personal
willingness to fight, they might have been surprised when they were confronted with the new and
modernized way of warfare in the trenches of the Western front.xxiv
In contrast to the mobilized warfare in the colonial spheres where the Gurkhas had been
brave and reliable soldiers, the battlefields in France just offered trench warfare, where the amount
of artillery seemed to be more important than the right fighting spirit.xxv Due to the lack of
movement during the campaigns, the Gurkhas were not able to become an effective weapon against

the enemies.
On 29 October 1914, the first Gurkhas reached Europe. When the 28th Regiment was
ordered into battle, the danger of losing almost a whole generation of Gurkha men was as high as
within other regiments. The so-called “lost generation“xxvi of the First World War, was as Nepalese
as it had been Australian, British, Canadian or European. Facing the modern face of warfare, no
level of bravery could have been sufficient to overcome a heavy artillery just by will and spirit.
Consequently, the very successful soldiers of the British Indian Army had no chance to gain a
victory in France, and after 13 months, the Indian Corps was transferred to the North-West Frontier
again. The harsh climate, the size of the trenches and the logistic problems regarding sufficient
Indian food supplies made the Nepalese soldiers unsuitable for the war planning of a European
campaign. Regardless of these facts and despite the outcome that the Gurkhas were not able to
provide a British victory, the soldiers from Nepal were well received as a positive aspect of Britain's
Asian Empire because neither the civil population nor the British officers could complain about
them.
It had simply been a mistake to send the Gurkha regiments to France, where the climatic and
geographic environment as well as the trench warfare was just unsuitable for the fighting style of
the Gurkha soldiers. Geography, climate and the way of warfare had their specific impact on the
usability of traditional colonial troops who were used to the fighting style on the Indian-Afghan
border region and not to a trench war. As a consequence of this miscalculation of the British
military, many young Gurkhas lost their lives during the 13 months at the Western front of the First
World War. They were sent to support the French and British contingents , yet the Gurkhas were
never able to succeed there. They arrived poorly equipped and had to face hunger, cold, mud,
dampness and trenches that were too deep for the short soldiers from Nepal.xxvii Despite the bad
conditions in their new fighting environment, the Gurkhas kept up their morale and tried to give
their best. Many of the soldiers as well as their officers died, shot like flies by the better equipped

German troops who were using machine guns to drown their enemies in a sea of blood. When the
Gurkhas participated in the British offensive at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, they had to face the
same fate as the European soldiers before them. They were dying in great numbers, and over just a
few minutes, whole regiments were erased from the course of history.
Due to the rather unsuitable environment, it, therefore, is no wonder that the Gurkhas would
receive more fame on other battlefields of the global war because other scenes of the global war
provided better stages for the “art of Gurkha warfare“.
Therefore, another place would become more glorious for these Nepalese men. All ten
Gurkha regiments sent at least one battalion to Mesopotamia, an important sphere of the Great
Warxxviii, even though the European powers regarded this battlefield as a minor sideline of the war
theater. With special regard to the large amount of Muslims living in the British Empire, the success
or failure of the British forces in this region was decisive for a large part of the colonial territories
of Great Britain especially since Turkey had proclaimed the beginning of a holy war in late 1914.
General Sir John Nixon (1857-1921) was requested to secure lower Mesopotamia against the Turks,
but driven by his thirst for fame, he developed an obsession for the seizure of Baghdadxxix, which
would cost a lot of soldiers their lives. He sent 11,000 men against the Turks at Kut-el-Amara,xxx
and when the troops were able to defeat the Turks, they were ordered to proceed against Baghdad.
However, the British forces were not able to continue the victories of the beginning of the campaign
and had to return to Kut on 3 December. After several days of hard fighting, they had to retreat from
there as well. The retreat from there was a shock for the British Empire that took two months for the
British army to recover from. Then the 2nd Gurkhasxxxi crossed the Tigris, built a strong bridgehead
and reopened the march on Baghdad again. Later, they were involved in the re-occupation of Kutal-Amara and when the British took Baghdad in March 1917. The war in Mesopotamia seemed to
be rather successful, compared to the Western Front in Europe, a fact that was also a consequence
of the fighting tactics, which were rather based on movement and mobility, in the Middle East. In

September 1918, General Allenby and the 27th Gurkha Regiment defeated the Turks at Megiddoxxxii,
securing British success at this stage of the Great War. The high temperatures, thirst and sand were
not as problematic as the rainy trenches of France, and the Gurkhas provided a vital part of the
British success in Mesopotamia. The battles in partly mountainous environments, the drier climate
and the moving battles were better suited for the small Nepalese soldiers, who were trained and
used to this kind of battle by their experiences on the Indian-Afghan border in the years before.
However, another battle would make them famous forever. The decisive battle of Gallipolixxxiii
should become a synonymous term not only for military failure but also for Gurkha bravery. The
events at Gallipoli not only impacted the creation and strengthening of an Australian nationalism
but also established the since ever told myth of the brave Gurkha, fighting for the British Empire.
By meeting other colonial troops, e.g. from Australia, and showing greater interest in each other, as
visible in the photograph in Figure 1 of an Australian soldier with his Nepalese comrades posing
with their kukris, the image of the Gurkha as an emblematic figure for bravery and chivalry was
spread even further.
However, the campaign on the Gallipoli Peninsula would finally create a myth that lasted
ever since with regard to the kukri using Gurkha soldiers. The Battle of Gallipoli was “one of the
most moving and tragic campaigns in all history, tragic not only in the severe loss of life but
because from the British point of view, priceless opportunities were thrown away after the first
landings on 25 April 1915”xxxiv. Despite the image of military failure, General Ian Hamilton
(1853-1947) decided well when he asked Lord Kitchener for some Gurkha troops for his campaign
because he was sure that “each little 'Gurk' might be worth his full weight in gold at
Gallipoli” (Farwell, 96). He received the 15th, 16th and 210th Gurkha Regiments, which then became
part of the 78,000 men who were going to land on the Mediterranean peninsula. (Figure 2) They
would encounter 60,000 Turks, led by the German general Otto Liman van Sanders (1855-1929)xxxv
as well as Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), who were able to cause severe casualties on the Allied side,

especially with regard to the ANZAC troops. The Gurkha troops did not arrive until the fifth day of
the campaign, and they were successful in the beginning when the so-called Gurkha bluff became a
victorious assault on a high Turkish stronghold. In a campaign due to which victories were rather
rare, the attempt of the Nepalese soldiers and their success were able to be used to create a new
legend of chivalry in the bloody sand of the beaches of Gallipoli.
The Gurkhas also participated in the third battle at Krithia, but even these Nepalese soldiers
were not able to seize the Achi Baba Hill, where the Turks caused another 7,000 casualties. The
planners of the British military staff had underestimated the strength of the Turkish enemy and the
hardship that would be presented by the geographical environment at Gallipoli. While the British
troops were landing on the wide beaches, the Turkish troops used machine gun fire to kill the
landing soldiers, who had to debark from the transporting ships before seeking concealment. Those
who were able to survive the landing had to mount the cliffs of the peninsula to face the Turks, but
until they got there, most of them were killed or wounded already.
Consequently, in the first five weeks of the campaign (25 April 1915 - 9 January 1916), the
210th Gurkha Regiment lost 70% of their officers and 40% of all soldiers. These numbers were no
exceptions because other regiments lost a lot of their men as well. In August, the short Nepalese
soldiers were also participating in an assault against Hill Q, but they were not able to seize the hill
for long. The British navy mistakenly opened fire on them, forcing Major C. J. L. Allanson and his
troops to retreat again and the Turks to re-occupy the hill. After many brave soldiers from New
Zealand, Australia and Nepal had died in the campaign and many more had become victims of cold
weather, for which they had not been prepared appropriately, at the end of 1915 (Fig.4), the British
military leaders commanded a retreat.
Even though the Gurkhas were not successful in gaining a complete victory on the
peninsula, during this important military campaign, “Gallipoli“ became an expression of Gurkha
bravery and honor. All in all, the First World War, with its high losses of human lives intermingled

with the fearless attempts of the small Nepalese soldiers, created a myth: the myth of the elite force
of the Gurkha soldiers. This force would never stop an assault no matter how dangerous the
situation would be. A lot of British officers who had served with these Nepalese soldiers wrote their
memoirsxxxvi or other stories of Gurkha bravery in the aftermath of the Great War, thereby
promoting the image of the regiments filled by the recruitment of young men from Nepal.

!
Effects

!
There are just a small number of soldiers who are really prepared for the cruel image a modern and
real war is going to present to them. The cruelties of the First World War were especially
frightening and traumatizing. Men like Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) were able to at least give an
impression of this modern warfare:

!
What was that about? War had shown its claws, and stripped off its mask of cosiness. It was all so strange, so
impersonal. We had barely begun to think about the enemy that mysterious, treacherous being somewhere. This
event, so far beyond anything we had experienced, made such a powerful impression on us that it was difficult to
understand what had happened. It was like a ghostly manifestation in broad daylight.xxxvii

!
The noise, confusion, blood, horror and a too real fear are sometimes more than a human being
could ever expect to meet in the trenches or on the battlefield, not only in the “hell of Verdun“.
Furthermore, the physical and psychological attrition as a consequence of cumulative filth and
fatigue could be too harsh for young men dreaming of a better future. Experiencing death in all its
possible and cruel ways traumatized a whole generation. It made them ill. However, the Gurkhas
had shown that they were reliable soldiers who were always eager to do their duty even if the
chances to survive were minimal. They attacked no matter how high or low their chances for
victory would be. Ironically, they made the “perfect soldiers“.

With the end of the First World War, due to which they had received their international
baptism of fire, no wise man would again question the challenge of a Gurkha regiment without
sufficient preparation. The harmless image of the short soldiers did not exist anymore. The men
who had even joked about death and the modern expression of Western civilization (e.g. planes)
were described and praised in countless memoirs, regimental histories, diaries and
autobiographies.xxxviii The Gurkhas were described as a visible expression of masculine heroes in
the battles of the Great War. These men were the resemblance of bravery, but only a courageous
British officer was able to lead the men to victory.xxxix Consequently, it was the might of the white
British officers to channel the brute force of the most valued soldiers of the Empire in battle. The
image of the brave Gurkha was thereby not able to overcome racist and chauvinist assumptions or
prejudices although it was able to show that the colored part of the British Army was of tremendous
importance. In contrast to other colonial subordinates, the Gurkhas were seen as a fighting race who
received the respect of their British masters who recognized themselves in the bravery of the
Gurkha soldiers.
However, the experience of the Gurkhas did even more for many other people. It was able to
show that there were Asian people who were as strong, as brave, and as loyal as Western soldiers.
Due to this, the participation of the Nepalese soldiers during the European war helped to overcome
the stereotypes of uncivilized and weak Asians, who must have been protected themselves. On the
other hand, this image was used by the British officers in their memoirs to defend the mission of
British imperialism as well because it was the impact of Western rule that made the high potential
of the Nepalese soldiers available.
Despite this Western interpretation, the bloody victories changed the reception of Asia in
many ways and that of Nepal and its brave soldiers in particular. It seems to be ironic, but by
sharing the deadly experiences of the Great War, the soldiers in British regiments related to each
other on the same level: as bleeding and dying soldiers ready to be killed in the name of honor and

glory for the British Empire.
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